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New Rules, New Technologies, and
the Shape of Minnesota Farming
STEVEN]. TAFF

The future development of Minnesota agriculture will be
strongly influenced by new technologies and government
policies that will alter prices for farm inputs and outputs.
While some farm operations will fail under most expected
price regimes, a loss of farmers will probably not have a
significant impact on overall farm production. However, the
new technologies and government policies could shift
Minnesota farming into either a more intensive (less land,
higher yield) or more extensive (more land, lower yield)
mode of operation. A shift either way will have important
implications for Minnesotans. Ownership and residence
patterns, ground water quality, habitat and soil consetvation
effons, and the overall character of the landscape all will be
affected differently.
If policy makers could anticipate the directions of these
shifts, the state might be able to plan for the new environment
or at least buffer the inevitable disruptions. But analysts have
not proven very good at predicting, both because of uncertainty as to which tre nds are relevant and because of
unforseen events that move the trends away from historic
patterns. Consequently, policy makers need to design farm
programs that are individually limited in scope and as a group
are flexible and responsive to changing economic conditions.

Steven J. Taff is an extension economist with the Department of
Agricultural and Applied Economics at the University of Minnesota.
In addition to his Ph.D. in agricultural economics, Taff holds an M.S.
in urban and regional planning At Minnesota, he specializes in the
economics of agricultural and natural resource policies, with
particular attention to the economic and environmental effects of
land retirement programs and water quality protection efforts.
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Context
The Farm Problem and Farming in Minnesota
There is little agreement about the diagnosis of America's
farm problem, let alone the prescription. Some argue that
farming is too big-business oriented; that it uses too many
chemicals; that small farmers are left in the lurch; that too few
people control too much land. Looking at the same world,
others see a production system saddled with innumerable
government regulations, unfair competition from other
countries, and excessive environmental protection
constraints.

Since 1950, Minnesota has "lost" some
88,000 farmers, while over the same
period, total cropland has hardly
budged from the 22 million acre level.

Most agree that there has been too much production and
too little farm income. The recent consensus seems to be that
Americans have overinvested in agriculture, at least for now,
and that there must be a reduction in resources devoted to
production in order to gain a proper balance between
production and income. When economists say "too many
resources," however, most people hear instead "too many
farmers. " Thus farm exit (farmers selling out) becomes for
some a prescription for efficiency and for others an indicator
of agriculture's malaise.
In fact, the "farm problem" is not chronic overproduction;
rather, it is the chronic mismatch of the resources devoted to
9

production and the demand for agricultural products. Surfeits
and deficits cycle with annoying regularity. When demand
outpaces supply (as it did most recently in the 1970s), prices
rise, stimulating an influx of capital into the sector as well as
an expansion of the land base prepared for planting. Usually,
the sector overshoots the mark and ends up in surplus. The
resulting lower prices lead to calls for government subsidies
and surplus reduction incentives. Prices rise as a result, and
investment is stimulated once again.
Farming as an industry is relatively insignificant in both its
demographic and economic impacts, but it controls the use
of a major portion of the landscape. The majority of people
who live in rural Minnesota are not farmers, and farmers
themselves are increasingly less reliant upon farm receipts for
their livelihood. Many farm families report more than half
their income comes from off-farm sources. While farm
products account for less than 5 percent of the state's
economy, farmers are the principal decision makers on over
half of Minnesota's land: some 22 million acres are cultivated
each year by 80-90,000 farmers.
But production levels (measured in acres or output
volume) and farm numbers are only loosely tied. Since 1950,
Minnesota has "lost" some 88,000 farmers, while over the
same period, total cropland has hardly budged from the 22
million acre level (Figure 1). The distribution of farm size has
changed. However, there have been relative increases in the
proportion of operations classified as either very large and
very small, while the proportion of medium-sized furms has
declined. This trend, particularly the observed increase in
average commercial farm size, has been used to support
claims of the imminent demise of the family farm. It is
unclear, however, whether size increases result from an
economic incentive to expand farm unit size, or whether
increasing average size is simply a statistical artifact of a
divergence in the independent trends of total cropland and
number of farms.
Farm size measured in acres doesn't provide a very clear
picture of the economic activity generated by different types
259r----------------.39

Key

_,.,....

.

299

___________________ ______ _

25

...

:;::

~

- - croplertd

/

29

.
~

u
D

159

~

15

~

...<
D

19

~
u

59

5

9

1~9~59~~~9~5~5~1~96~9~1~9H65~~~9~79~-~9~7~5~1H98~9~~~9~85 9
Veer

Figure 1: Minnesota farm numbers and cropland acreage:
1950-1985.
Source: Farm Real Estate: Historical Series Data, 1950-1985.
USDA/ERS Statistical Bulletin 738, December 1985.

of farms. A turkey operation, for example, may be small in
acres, but it generates a great deal of income. At the other
extreme some livestock operations are large in geographic
extent, but their per-acre value added is usually quite low.
The other commonly employed measure of farm size is sales
of farm products; farms that sell more are "larger." This
measure has the drawback that it is not invariant with time,
since it depends upon growing conditions, management
decisions, price fluctuations, and inflation.
Whichever indicator is used, the distribution of farms sizes
is still heavily skewed toward the lower end: most Minnesota
farms are still small, even though most farm output comes
from a relatively few larger farms.

Governing the Farm and Farming the Government
Contrary to the resource allocation argument advanced
above, American farm policy has traditionally (albeit implicitly at times) defined the farm problem simply as one of
recurring low farm prices that force family farmers off their
land. The simple causality is reflected in the traditional
solution: raise prices.
The approach has been two-fold. First, by restricting the
number of acres planted, the government has tried to use
scarcity to drive market prices higher. (In Minnesota, such
price support programs operate in the major grain crops. The
dairy price support program relies upon the government
boosting demand as a buyer of last resort.) In years when
consumer demand is high, price support programs are not
used, because the non-intervention price is thought sufficiently high. The costs of price support programs are borne
by consumers, not by taxpayers.
The second way the United States has tried to boost farm
prices is to subsidize the difference between the market price
and some agreed-upon higher "fair" price. In current
parlance, the higher price is called the target price, and the
difference between it and the market price is called the
deficiency payment: the higher the market price; the lower
the deficiency payment. The costs of deficiency payment
programs are paid by taxpayers, not by consumers.
Left to themselves, price enhancement schemes encourage
higher production than would prevail if prices were at their
"natural" levels. More resources (fertilizer, tractor time,
management) are invested in crop production, so perplanted-acre yields are higher, and more land is cultivated.
Farmers also have the incentive to concentrate their resources
on a relative handful of subsidized crops, regardless of
underlying commercial demand. If unchecked, output
expansion would add downward pressure on prices, defeating the purpose of the subsidies.
So, in return for government subsidies, American farmers
are usually required to set aside (to idle) a portion of their
established production capacity. (There are other ways to
control production, such as quotas, but the only politically
palatable supply management weapon in the American policy
arsenal has been land idling.) Set-asides have two purposes,
not unrelated. First, they reduce potential government
outlays, because commodity subsidies are paid on actual
production, which is now diminished by the required idling.
Second, set-asides reduce the amount of production of the
crop in question, which· serves to push prices upward and to
further reduce the government's outlays. Combined, the
government subsidies and set-aside programs ideally result in
price movements (and hence farm income) being buffered
on the low side.

Census of Agriculture. U.S. Bureau of the Census.
Various dates.
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Changes
Technology
Stories of high-yield wheat, pigs as big as elephants, and
super milk cows have led some observers to predict significant shifts in the way our food production system works. Will
such shifts work their way through to farm structure?
Yield enhancing technologies are hardly new to American
agriculture. Since 1950, worldwide farm productivity has
increased an average of 2.4 percent per year. Some of these
gains can be attributed to increased use of machinery and
agricultural chemicals, and some are due to new crop
varieties that more efficiently process input into final product.
One might hope, then, that the past record of farm structure
changes might be able to help us anticipate the results of
promised upcoming technological revolutions. Unfortunately, this isn't the case. Potential yields will certainly
increase, so the amount of land necessary to meet a particular
level of demand could decrease. But this link is by no means
certain; technology adoption is far less inevitable than it used
to be. And farm production levels and farm population levels
are largely unrelated, as we saw above. So even the direction
of the impacts is uncertain, let alone their magnitude. The
farm population will probably continue to decline, in part
because of better off-farm employment opportunities, but it
won't drop as much as it might in the absence of government
farm subsidies. Farm size shifts will depend upon which
drops faster, planted acreage or farm numbers.
A second type of agricultural technology being developed
will reduce environmental damages. Tillage practices that
minimize soil erosion and pesticides that don't leach into
groundwater systems are two examples. This type of technological change will have little effect upon farm structure if the
present regulatory environment remains unchanged. Farmers
don't pay for pollution damage now, so they have no
incentive to adopt pollution reducing technology unless it
also costs less or enhances yields. If rules are changed,
however, then environment-enhancing technologies will
clearly become cost reducing.
Policy
Technology rarely evolves alone; it is usually accompanied
by changes in the institutional environment. Two major
institutional shifts might affect the way Minnesota farmers
make crop allocation and land tenure decisions. First, it
seems inevitable that farmers will lose some or all of their
current right to pollute. Second, it seems possible that federal
farm subsidy programs will increasingly be tied to the farm
unit and not to specific commodity crops.
Farmers currently select crop and production techniques
on the basis of input costs (for machinery, labor, cost of
capital, chemicals, seeds) and output prices (for crops and
livestock). Any costs imposed on society by the farming
operation are not factored into the farmer's economic
calculus. In particular, off-site damages caused by soil erosion
or chemical contamination of groundwater are not charged
back to the farmer.
If the rules were changed so that farmers became liable for
some of the public damages, then any associated clean-up or
avoidance costs would be added to the costs of the input or
production technique that causes the damage. The anticipated tightening of environmental regulations, such as
pesticide bans to reduce groundwater pollution, will provide
incentives for farmers to shift away from pollution-causing
crops and practices. These shifts will have no direct effect on
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farm structure if all farmers have equal access to the new
technologies and if all farms are equally subject to costincreasing regulations. If, on the other hand, only some farms
(big farms or livestock farms or hilly farms) are subject to the
imposition of new costs or can afford the new technologies,
then the structural (and geographic) effects could be
significant. For example, recent policies restricting farming
practices on highly erodible land inevitably reduce the
potential profits of those who happen to own the targeted
land. Farmers in hilly regions are placed at a competitive
disadvantage to those in flatter regions.
A second anticipated institutional change is the reduction
of the present reliance upon commodity specific farm
programs. The scheme currently travels under the rubric
"decoupling," as in the decoupling of farm support programs
from production decisions. The rationale for such proposals
is that farmers should be allowed to plant whatever they want,
with the decision based strictly upon market prices. When
demand is high for soybeans, farmers could plant more
soybeans; if the market says it wants amaranth, somebody
could plant amaranth. Market prices would determine not
only what is planted but also how much is planted; the
government would be out of the picture as far as crop
selection goes. To protect current farmers who might not
survive such a policy shift, the government would make cash
payments unrelated to production.
Decoupling is the centerpiece of the U.S. proposal at the
ongoing International General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT) negotiations. It will also be a prominent
feature of the upcoming debate over renewal of U.S. farm
subsidy legislation. Its passage, at least in its "purest" forms,
is by no means certain.

Prospects
Over the next decade, Minnesota farmers will be increasingly exposed to yield enhancing technological innovations,
strict environmental controls, and commodity prices
unbuoyed by government subsidies. This could lead to lower
prices, lower land requirements, and higher production costs.
Those farmers whose operations cannot thrive in the new
setting will fail unless protected in some way by government
action. What might be the implications of this "downsizing"
of Minnesota agriculture?
One possible outcome is a more intensive farming system,
consisting of those farms that can achieve sufficient efficiencies in production on a smaller land base, using high-yield
technologies. The remaining "farmers" would be supported
by government income transfers or by off-farm employment.
Average farm size would decrease, since farm numbers would
remain unchanged, but nearly all production would be
attributed to a relatively few large farmers.
But there is another possibility. If, as some economists
argue, land values reflect most of the gains from investment
in agriculture, then land values might absorb most of the
recent financial losses as well, and drop faster than other
input prices. If land prices fall far enough, then at some point
a dollar spent on more land will return more profit than a
dollar spent on more chemicals (or machines or labor).
Coupled with this is the probability that stricter environmental controls will raise the effective cost of many current tillage
and chemical practices. Yield enhancing technologies might
not be that good a buy. All this could lead to relatively less
reliance upon chemicals (in the short run) and on machines
(in the longer run). To meet production needs, we would see
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as much or more land in farms as we do now, but the land
would be farmed less intensively.
There are two plausible futures, one in which productivity
gains dominate policy protections and push Minnesota
agriculture into a more intensive mode, and other in which
policy restrictions dominate yield increases and shift the state
into a more extensive mode of production.
In the face of possible social and economic changes, it is
commonplace to call for more planning to anticipate and
possibly avoid maladjustments. Unfortunately, the farm
problem, the chronic mismatch of productive resources and
effective demand, simply may not succumb to careful
analysis, reasoned exposition, and judicious planning. Our
ability to predict the course of economic and social events
may never equal our desire to control adverse consequences.
The recent drought in the United States, Canada, and China
underscores the point. Virtually overnight, world grain
reserves plummeted. Policy attention was quickly diverted
from dealing with unwanted surpluses toward encouraging
production and supporting consumers, particularly those in
developing countries.
A coherent national farm policy may be a will-o-the-wisp.
An alternative is to instead craft a loose set of single purpose
programs that stress flexibility and quick response. For
example, annual set-asides provide a reasonably good
mechanism to manage the ebb and flow of overproduction
(but not excess capacity), but they are not very good at
dealing with environmental problems caused by farming.
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They should be used to control supply and nothing else.
Similarly, environmental problems, which are generally long
term in nature, should be dealt with by longer term programs,
such as the Reinvest in Minnesota (RIM) Reserve or the
federal Conservation Reserve Program.
In the event that the nexus of events leads to a more
intensive agriculture in Minnesota ten years from now, one
subset of ready-to-go programs must deal with the question
of what we're going to do with the land (and other factors)
not then needed for food production. A multi-year set-aside
program and government purchase of short term cropping
rights easements are two possibilities.
In the event that Minnesota agriculture becomes more
extensive, another subset of programs must address the
ownership and size structure desired for the expanded land
base and how to ensure that cropping practices minimize soil
and habitat loss. Restrictions on farm size could encourage
more wide-based ownership; deed restrictions on newlyfarmed land could require certain environmentally beneficial
cropping practices.
The future character of Minnesota agriculture is not
something completely out of public control but this alternative approach, sort of a policy agnosticism, commends a
certain caution in far-reaching policy prescriptions. A more
modest complex of flexible programs that can be modified
as events unfold may be preferable to a static framework
locked into today's perceptions of tomorrow's world.
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